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Abstract
The paper considers a problem of detecting and mitigating biasing attacks on networks of state observers targeting cooperative state
estimation algorithms. The problem is cast within the recently developed framework of distributed estimation utilizing the vector
dissipativity approach. The paper shows that a network of distributed observers can be endowed with an additional attack detection
layer capable of detecting biasing attacks and correcting their effect on estimates produced by the network. An example is provided
to illustrate the performance of the proposed distributed attack detector.
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1. Introduction
Recent developments in the area of networked control and
estimation have been increasingly focused on resilience of net-
worked control systems to intentional malicious input attacks
aiming to compromise stability and performance of control sys-
tems. Owing to the networked nature of such control systems,
typically not all measurements are available at nodes of the net-
work to allow efficient attack and fault detection [7, 21]; this
has made distributed approaches particularly attractive. For in-
stance, [25] considers distributed fault detection for second or-
der dynamics at each node. Each node has the model of the
entire network or the model of its neighbourhood; in the latter
case interconnections of the neighbours to the agents outside
the neighbourhood are treated as undesirable disturbances to be
rejected. A bank of fault observers is constructed for each fault
model. The situation is considered where the network topology
is uncertain, and can be captured as a norm-bounded uncertain
perturbation of the global network model.
Another fault detection algorithm is proposed in [10] which
considers a fault input to the plant with multiple randomly fail-
ing sensors (random packet drop-out) for a discrete-time sys-
tem. A discrete-time system model is also considered in [8],
and it is assumed that both plant and sensors are subject to
Markovian switching. The reference considers a fault input to
the plant and uses sensor information fusion from several nodes
to generate the residuals for fault detection.
A considerable progress on the problem has been achieved
in [20] which not only considered the problem of residual gen-
eration for linear systems given in a quite general descriptor
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form, but also has characterized system vulnerabilities from the
system theoretic perspective of attack input detectability. We
also refer to [21] where connections have been drawn between
the network topology and attack input detectability.
This paper considers the problem of detecting attacks on
consensus-based distributed estimation networks. The topic of
distributed estimation has gained considerable attention in the
literature, in a bid to reduce communication bottlenecks and
improve reliability and fidelity of centralized state observers.
Filter cooperation and consensus ideas have proved to be instru-
mental in the design of distributed state observers [17, 24, 27].
At the same time, consensus-based systems are particularly vul-
nerable to intentional attacks since the compromised agents can
interfere with the functions of the entire network in a significant
way [19]. Uncertainty and noise represent another challenge
from the attack detection viewpoint — state observers are typi-
cally required in applications where uncertainty and noise make
accessing the system state difficult; this may allow the attack-
ers to remain undetected by injecting signals compatible with
the noise statistics [20]. This motivates an increased interest in
detection of rogue behaviours of state observers [14].
In this paper, we are concerned with resilience properties of
a general class of distributed state estimation networks consid-
ered, for example, in [24, 27, 29]. The attack model assumes
that the state observers at the compromised nodes are driven
by certain attack/fault inputs. Referring to conventional false-
data injection models [26], the model considered here is quite
general, with several noteworthy features. Firstly, we consider
the attacks that force a rogue behaviour at the affected node by
interfering with the data processing algorithm. Similar to bias
injection attacks considered in [26], the attack inputs are not
assumed to be constant and can include an uncertain transient
component to reflect the adversary’s desire to make the attack
stealthy. The purpose of the attack under consideration is to
force the compromised node to produce biased state estimates
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and then exploit interconnections within the network to propa-
gate those estimates across the network.
In terms of resources required to launch an attack, the ad-
versary does not require any knowledge of the system model to
carry out the attack, it relies on the misappropriated observer
to produce rogue messages which are then injected into other
nodes of the network through existing network communica-
tions. Our interest in this paper is in detecting and tracking
attack/fault inputs causing such a rogue behaviour. For this, the
paper proposes to introduce additional filters in the attack de-
tectors at every network node. The idea behind the introduction
of such filters is to differentiate imminently dangerous compo-
nents of the attack inputs from components whose effect is akin
to that of ‘ever-present disturbances’. Since distributed H∞ ob-
servers such as those considered in [24, 27, 29] are constructed
to attenuate disturbances, by design they are less sensitive to
exogenous ‘disturbance-like’ inputs. On the other hand, low-
frequency biasing inputs such as constant inputs do not directly
fit within the class of ‘finite-energy disturbances’ typically con-
sidered within the H∞ design. Such inputs may cause node ob-
servers to produce biased state estimates, therefore they are of
primary concern. The proposed filters are to assist with moni-
toring the node observers to detect biases caused by such inputs.
Tracking disturbances in a large-scale system is not uncom-
mon. E.g., in [23] distributed integral action controllers were
used for averaging constant disturbances to enable all agents in
the system to synchronize to a common reference system gov-
erned by the averaged constant disturbance. In contrast, in this
paper we aim at tracking and suppressing individual attack in-
puts applied at certain observer nodes, rather than tracking an
averaged attack vector. Additional filter dynamics introduced
in the fault detectors are instrumental to solve that task.
From the viewpoint of fault detection/input estimation, the
system subject to attack is distributed itself. This problem set-
ting is similar to [25], but is different from [10, 8] which were
focused on detecting faults in the plant. Overall, the techniques
developed in this paper have a number of distinct features:
(a) We are concerned with resilience of general multidimen-
sional consensus-based observers to biasing attacks that
target estimation algorithms at misappropriated observer
nodes rather than sensor measurements or communication
channels.
(b) The proposed attack detector is distributed and the node
detectors interact to detect and mitigate the attack.
(c) Our approach utilizes methodologies of vector dissipativity
and H∞ estimation. This allows us to accommodate uncer-
tainties in the sensors and the plant model.
(d) The proposed attack detectors utilize the same plant mea-
surements and the same communication channels that are
used by the networked observer to solve the original plant
estimation task. But extra information needs to be com-
municated between the neighbour agents. This allows us
to determine which of the node observers is compromised,
without introducing additional communication sensors or
communication channels.
The paper is an extended version of the conference paper [5].
Compared with the conference version, the paper has been
substantially extended. The present version includes complete
proofs and an example which were not included in the prelim-
inary version. The presentation has been substantially revised,
to show that the results hold under somewhat less restrictive
design conditions. Also, two new sections have been added
which discuss the detectability conditions of the network and
show that the proposed attack detectors can be used for counter-
ing biasing attacks on a network of distributed observers under
consideration, providing the distributed estimation algorithms
under consideration with an additional level of resilience.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, a background
on distributed consensus based estimation is presented, and the
model of attack is introduced. The class of biasing attacks is
formally defined in Section 3, and the attack detection problem
is also formulated in that section. The main results are given in
Section 4, where sufficient conditions in terms of coupled lin-
ear matrix inequalities are expressed to enable the design of a
networked attack detector. In Section 5, we show that the out-
puts of the proposed attack detectors can be used for correcting
biased state estimates. This allows the system to remain op-
erational under attack, meeting the objective of resilient system
design. Conditions on detectability of the network are discussed
in Section 6. An illustrative example is presented in Section 7,
and finally some concluding remarks are given in Section 8.
Notation: Rn denotes the real Euclidean n-dimensional vec-
tor space, with the norm ‖x‖ = (x′x)1/2; here the symbol ′ de-
notes the transpose of a matrix or a vector. The symbol I de-
notes the identity matrix, and 0m×n denotes the zero matrix of
size m × n. We will occasionally use I and 0 for notational
convenience if no confusion is expected. The symbols | · | and
Re(·) denote respectively the magnitude and the real part of a
complex number. For real symmetric n × n matrices X and
Y, Y > X (respectively, Y ≥ X) means the matrix Y − X is
positive definite (respectively, positive semidefinite). Ker and
rank denote the null-space and rank of a matrix. The nota-
tion L2[0,∞) refers to the Lebesgue space of R
n-valued vector-
functions z(.), defined on the time interval [0,∞), with the norm
‖z‖2 ,
(∫ ∞
0
‖z(t)‖2dt
)1/2
and the inner product
∫ ∞
0
z′
1
(t)z2(t)dt.
2. Background: Continuous-time distributed estimation
Consider an observer network with N nodes and a directed
graph topology G = (V,E) where V and E are the set of ver-
tices and the set of edges (i.e, the subset of the set V × V), re-
spectively. Without loss of generality, we let V = {1, 2, . . . ,N}.
The graph G is assumed to be directed, reflecting the fact that
while node i receives the information from node j, this relation
may not be reciprocal. The notation ( j, i) denotes the edge of
G originating at node j and ending at node i. It is assumed that
the nodes of the graph G have no self-loops, i.e., (i, i) < E.
For each i ∈ V, let Vi = { j : ( j, i) ∈ E} be the set of nodes
supplying information to node i. The cardinality of Vi, known
as the in-degree of node i, is denoted pi; i.e., pi is equal to
the number of incoming edges for node i. Also, qi will denote
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the number of outgoing edges for node i, known as the out-
degree of node i. Let A = [ai j] be the adjacency matrix of the
digraph G, i.e., ai j = 1 if ( j, i) ∈ E, otherwise ai j = 0. Then,
pi =
∑N
j=1 ai j =
∑
j∈Vi ai j, qi =
∑N
j=1 a ji.
A typical distributed estimation problem considers a plant
described by the equation
x˙ = Ax + Bξ(t), x(0) = x0, x ∈ R
n, (1)
governed by a disturbance input ξ ∈ Rm. A network of filters
connected according to the graph G takes measurements of the
plant with the purpose to produce an estimate of x. It is assumed
that each filter takes measurements
yi = Cix + Diξ + D¯iξi, (2)
where ξi(t) ∈ R
mi represents the measurement disturbance at the
local sensing node i, and processes them locally using an infor-
mation communicated by its neighbours j, j ∈ Vi. An under-
lying feature of the problem is that in general, the pairs (A,Ci)
are not required to be detectable. This has an implication that
the nodes with undetectable pairs (A,Ci) can only obtain biased
estimates of the plant, making cooperation between the nodes a
necessity. Requirements on local sensors and the network to en-
able unbiased cooperative networked state estimation have been
considered in the recent literature; e.g., see [6, 32, 2].
Depending on the nature of the disturbances ξ, ξi, cooperative
processing of measurements can be done using Kalman [17],
H∞ [24, 27, 29] filters, etc. Many of the existing algorithms
utilize networks of cooperating filters, each producing an esti-
mate xˆi of the state x using an observer of the form
˙ˆxi = Axˆi + Li(yi(t) −Ci xˆi) + Ki
∑
j∈Vi
H(xˆ j − xˆi), (3)
xˆi(0) = 0;
here the matrices Li, Ki are the parameters of the filter. Each
filter combines processing of innovations obtained from local
measurements with feedback from its neighbours, captured in
the last term (3) where the neighbours’ estimates are xˆ j, j ∈ Vi.
The matrix H determines what information about xˆ j is shared
between the nodes. For simplicity of presentation, we assume
that communication channels between the nodes are ideal, and
node i receives the precise value of Hxˆ j, and that the matrices
H are identical across the network. More general formulations
which allow for disturbances in communication channels and
heterogeneity in communicated information can be easily ac-
commodated within our approach, as they do not bring addi-
tional technical challenges.
The general problem of distributed estimation is to deter-
mine estimator gains Li and Ki in (3) to ensure the filter inter-
nal stability and acceptable filtering performance against distur-
bances. Therefore, from the system resilience viewpoint it is of
interest to consider the situation where one or several nodes of
the network of observers (3) are subject to an attack whose aim
is to interfere with these filtering performance objectives. A
most common scenario of such an attack considered in the lit-
erature involves the attacker tempering with the measurements
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Figure 1: An auxiliary ‘input tracking’ model.
and/or communications between the nodes. In contrast, we con-
sider the situation where the attacker mounts an attack on the
observer dynamics directly. That is, we consider the scenario
where some of the nodes are misappropriated by the attacker
and, in lieu of (3), generate their estimates according to
˙ˆxi = Axˆi + Li(yi(t) −Ci xˆi)
+Ki
∑
j∈Vi
H(xˆ j − xˆi) + Fi fi, xˆi(0) = 0. (4)
Here Fi ∈ R
n×n f is a constant “fault entry matrix” (e.g., see
[22]) and fi ∈ R
n f is the unknown signal representing an attack
input. The gains of the observers and the network topology are
not affected by the attacker and are assumed to be fixed (cf. [6]).
From now on, our focus is exclusively on the network of ob-
servers (4), although our approach to detection and mitigation
of biasing attacks can be readily applied to other mentioned dis-
tributed state estimation algorithms as well. For instance, if the
communication link between node i and k : k ∈ Vi is under
attack such that node k instead of receiving xˆk receives a biased
estimate of xˆk + ℓik where ℓik is an attack signal, then this situa-
tion is still captured by the biased estimator model (4) in which
Fi = KiH and fi = ℓik. Therefore, the analysis presented in the
paper is applicable to this type of attack as well.
The class of attacks considered in this paper does not contain
attacks that cause nodes or links to fall out of the network. Our
consideration is that the objectives of the biasing attacker are
different from the objectives of a jamming attacker. Attacking
links to fail is a kind of DoS attack, and these attacks disrupt
the normal flow of information within the network. In contrast,
the biasing attacker who misappropriates a node benefits from
integrity of the network links, since it uses them to spread the
biased xˆi across the network. Therefore the analysis in the paper
is carried out under the assumption that it is not in the attacker’s
interests to block network links. Attack stealthiness considera-
tions also support this assumption. While jammers act openly
to block communication links or sensing nodes1, we consider
that the intention of a biasing attacker is to remain hidden, in
order to inject the false data for as long as possible. Unusual
patterns in nodes and links failures will likely to prompt main-
tenance which may reveal the attacker. Thus it may be risky for
the biasing attacker to disrupt connectivity if it wishes to remain
stealthy.
1Generally, it is quite difficult for the jammer to remain stealthy [30].
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3. Problem formulation
To be concrete, from now on we build the presentation
around the distributed H∞ cooperative estimation problem [27,
29], although the approach to bias attack detection proposed in
this paper is general enough to allow extensions to other types
of filters in an obvious manner. In line with the disturbance
model considered in [27, 29], it will be assumed throughout
the paper that the disturbances ξ, ξi belong to L2[0,∞). This
assumption suffices to guarantee that equation (1) has an L2-
integrable solution on any finite time interval [0, T ], even when
the matrix A is unstable.
3.1. Admissible biasing attacks
We now present a class of biasing attacks on misappropriated
nodes of the filter (4) that will be considered in this paper. First
consider a class of attack input signals fi(t), t ≥ 0, of the form
fi(t) = fi1(t) + fi2(t), (5)
where the Laplace transform of fi1(t), fi1(s), is such that f
∞
i1
,
supω ‖ω fi1( jω)‖
2 < ∞ and fi2 ∈ L2[0,∞). In particular, this
class includes attack inputs whose Laplace transform is rational
and has no more than one pole at the origin, with the remaining
poles located in the open left half-plane of the complex plane.
This class of inputs will be denoted F . It includes as a spe-
cial case bias injection attack inputs consisting of a steady-state
component and an exponentially decaying transient component
generated by a low pass filter introduced in [26].
It is easy to show that there exists a proper square n f × n f
transfer function2 Gi(s) for which the system in Fig. 1 is stable
and ∫ ∞
0
‖ fi − fˆi‖
2dt < ∞ (6)
for all fi with the properties stated above. Indeed, we can select
Gi(s) =
N(s)
D(s)
I, for which the system in Fig. 1 is stable; here N(s)
and D(s) are real polynomials with deg(N) ≤ deg(D). It follows
from stability of the system in Fig. 1 that jωD( jω)+N( jω) , 0
∀ω. This conclusion trivially follows from the Nyquist crite-
rion. Hence, a , supω
∣∣∣∣ jωD( jω)jωD( jω)+N( jω)
∣∣∣∣2 < ∞. Then3
1
2π
∫
+∞
−∞
‖(I +
1
jω
Gi( jω))
−1 fi( jω)‖
2dω
≤ f∞i1
∫ ∞
−∞
∣∣∣∣∣ D( jω)jωD( jω) + N( jω)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
dω
+a
∫ ∞
−∞
‖ fi2( jω)‖
2dω < ∞. (7)
Define νi = fˆi − fi. Denoting the Laplace transforms of fi and
νi as fi(s) and νi(s) respectively, and noting that
νi(s) = −(I +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1 fi(s),
2A proper transfer function (respectively, a strictly proper transfer function)
is a transfer function in which the degree of numerator does not exceed (respec-
tively, is less than) the degree of the denominator.
3Here, ‖ · ‖ is the induced norm of a matrix.
we conclude from (7) that (6) is satisfied.
Furthermore, if Gi(s) is selected so that
lim
s→0
‖(I +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1‖ = 0, (8)
then for all inputs fi ∈ F ,
lim
t→∞
‖ fi(t) − fˆi(t)‖ = 0. (9)
The proof of this fact is given in the Appendix.
In summary, we have observed that a large class of biasing
inputs (which includes bias injection attack inputs introduced
in [26]) can be represented as
fi = fˆi − νi,
where νi is an L2 integrable discrepancy between the attack in-
put fi and its ‘model’ fˆi. For this, the model generating transfer
function Gi(s) needs to satisfy very mild assumptions - it must
be proper, and the closed loop system in Fig. 1 must be stable.
Other than that, Gi(s) can be chosen arbitrarily. This allows us
to proceed assuming formally that a collection of transfer func-
tions Gi(s), i = 1, . . . ,N, with the above properties has been
selected, and a set of biasing inputs fi is associated with this se-
lection of transfer functions consisting of all signals fi for which
(6) holds. We will refer to the inputs from this set as admissi-
ble biasing inputs. Clearly, such set is quite rich; as we have
shown, it subsumes all inputs (5) and, consequently, the input
set F and biasing attack inputs defined in [26]. In addition, L2-
integrable inputs fi which represent attack inputs with a limited
energy resource [26] also belong to the set of admissible inputs
since they are trivially represented in the form (5). It must be
stressed that even thoughGi(s) is selected, the details of admis-
sible biasing inputs, e.g., the asymptotic steady-state value or
the shape of the transient, remain unknown to the designer.
We conclude this section by presenting a state space form of
the system in Fig. 1 which will be used in the sequel. Since
Gi(s) is proper, the transfer function
1
s
Gi(s) is strictly proper.
Hence, a state space realization for the system in Fig. 1, e.g.,
the minimal state space realization, is of the form
ǫ˙i = Ωiǫi + Γiνi, ǫi(0) = 0, (10)
fˆi = Υiǫi,
where νi = fˆi − fi is an L2-integrable input. For example, for
the system Gi(s) =
di
s+2βi
I, we can let ǫi ∈ R
2n f , and
Ωi =
[
0 I
0 −2βiI
]
, Γi =
[
0
−diI
]
, Υi = [I 0]. (11)
In what follows, the state space model (10) will be used in the
derivation of attack detectors, and the sufficient conditions for
attack detection proposed in the paper will include the parame-
ters of the model (10). Some trials may be required in order to
select these parameters to obtain satisfactorily performing de-
tectors.
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3.2. The distributed attack detector
The objective of the paper is to design a distributed attack
detection system which is capable of tracking and suppressing
admissible attack inputs. To achieve this task, we first summa-
rize the information about the network available at each node,
which will be used by the attack detectors. This information
consists of the pair of innovation output signals
ζi = yi −Ci xˆi = Ci(x − xˆi) + Diξ + D¯iξi, (12)
ζ¯i =
∑
j∈Vi
H(xˆ j − xˆi). (13)
The idea behind introducing these outputs is as follows. If node
i is under attack, then its predicted sensor measurement Ci xˆi
is expected to be biased, compared to the actual measurement
yi. This must lead to a significant difference between these two
signals, i.e., we must expect a large energy in ζi. Likewise, the
plant state estimate xˆi at the misappropriated node i, is expected
to deviate, at least during an initial stage of the attack, from the
estimates produced at the neighbouring nodes. Thus, the vari-
able ζ¯i describing dynamics of the disagreement between node
i and its neighbours is expected to differ from similar variables
produced by network nodes not affected by the attack. This
motivates using the innovation signals (12), (13) as inputs to
the attack detector. They can be readily generated at node i;
computing them only requires the local measurement yi, the lo-
cal estimate Hxˆi computed by the observer at node i and the
neighbours’ signals Hxˆ j, j ∈ Vi, available at node i; see (4).
Let ei = x − xˆi be the local estimation error at node i. Us-
ing (1) and (4), it is straightforward to verify that each error ei
satisfies the following equation:
e˙i = (A − LiCi)ei + Ki
∑
j∈Vi
H(e j − ei)
+(B − LiDi)ξ − LiD¯iξi − Fi fi, ei(0) = x0. (14)
Combine the system (14) with the auxiliary input tracking
model (10):
e˙i = (A − LiCi)ei + Ki
∑
j∈Vi
H(e j − ei) − FiΥiǫi
+ (B − LiDi)ξ − LiD¯iξi + Fiνi, ei(0) = x0,
ǫ˙i = Ωiǫi + Γiνi ǫi(0) = 0. (15)
Here, we have used the relation fi = Υiǫi − νi; see (10). The
resulting system (15) equipped with the outputs (16), (17) can
be regarded as an uncertain system governed by L2-integrable
inputs ξ, ξi and νi. Each such system is interconnected with its
neighbours via inputs e j, and the collection of all such systems
represents a large-scale system. The innovations (12), (13) can
be regarded as outputs of this large-scale system since they can
be written in terms of the estimation errors as
ζi = Ciei + Diξ + D¯iξi, (16)
ζ¯i = −
∑
j∈Vi
H(e j − ei). (17)
We propose the following distributed H∞ observer for the
large-scale system (15) as an attack detector for the observer
network (4). The detector is to utilize the outputs (12), (13) of
the system (4) (equivalently, the outputs (16), (17)) to estimate
dynamics ei and ǫi of the system (15) while attenuating the dis-
turbances ξ, ξi and νi, i = 1, . . . ,N. The proposed detector is
therefore as follows:
˙ˆei = (A − LiCi)eˆi + Ki
∑
j∈Vi
H(eˆ j − eˆi) − FiΥiǫˆi
+ L¯i(ζi − Cieˆi) + K¯i
ζ¯i +
∑
j∈Vi
H(eˆ j − eˆi)
 ,
˙ˆǫi = Ωiǫˆi + Lˇi(ζi −Cieˆi) + Kˇi
ζ¯i +
∑
j∈Vi
H(eˆ j − eˆi)
 ,
εˆi = Υiǫˆi, (18)
eˆi(0) = 0, ǫˆi(0) = 0.
The coefficients L¯i, K¯i, Lˇi, Kˇi are to be found to ensure that the
output εˆi = Υiǫˆi of the system (18) tracks the output fˆi of the
auxiliary system (10). Since fˆi converges to fi in the L2[0,∞)
sense, we propose that εˆi is to be used as a residual variable
indicating whether the attack is taking place.
Remark 1. The proposed attack detector requires each node to
dynamically update two other vectors, namely eˆi and ǫˆi. Thus,
in all, each node will require updating an augmented vector
whose dimension is 2n+n f . This potentially increases the com-
putational burden on the filtering nodes. This is the price of
dynamically estimating the state observer error ei and ǫi. In
a typical distributed state estimation scenario, state estimation
errors are not observed. However, in our problem concerned
with resilient estimation, we require additional variables to de-
tect and track changes in the observer dynamics and to mitigate
the effect of the attack.
To formalize the above idea, introduce the error vectors zi =
ei − eˆi, δi = ǫi − ǫˆi for the attack detector system (18). It can be
seen from (15) and (18) that the evolution of these error vectors
is governed by the following equations
z˙i = (A − LiCi)zi + Ki
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi) − FiΥiδi
− L¯iCizi + K¯i
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi)
+ (B − LiDi)ξ − LiD¯iξi + Fiνi − L¯iDiξ − L¯iD¯iξi,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − LˇiCizi + Kˇi
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi)
− LˇiDiξ − LˇiD¯iξi + Γiνi,
̟i = fˆi − εˆi = Υiδi, (19)
zi(0) = x0, δi(0) = 0.
Using the notation L˜i = Li + L¯i, K˜i = Ki + K¯i, (19) can be
simplified as
z˙i = (A − L˜iCi)zi + K˜i
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi) − FiΥiδi
+ (B − L˜iDi)ξ − L˜iD¯iξi + Fiνi, zi(0) = x0,
5
δ˙i = Ωiδi − LˇiCizi + Kˇi
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi)
− LˇiDiξ − LˇiD¯iξi + Γiνi, δi(0) = 0. (20)
Our design objective can formally be expressed as the prob-
lem concerned with asymptotic behaviour of the system (20).
Problem 1 (The distributed H∞ detector design problem).
The distributed attack detection problem is to determine L¯i, K¯i,
Lˇi, Kˇi for the distributed attack detector (18) which ensure that
the following properties hold:
(i) The large-scale system (20) is internally stable. That is,
the disturbance and attack-free large-scale system
z˙i = (A − L˜iCi)zi + K˜i
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi) − FiΥiδi,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − LˇiCizi + Kˇi
∑
j∈Vi
H(z j − zi), (21)
zi(0) = x0, δi(0) = 0,
must be asymptotically stable.
(ii) In the presence of L2-integrable disturbances and admis-
sible biasing inputs, the system (20) achieves a guaran-
teed level of H∞ disturbance attenuation:
sup
x0,w,0
∫ ∞
0
∑N
i=1(δ
′
i
Qiδi + z
′
i
Q¯izi)dt
‖x0‖
2
P
+
∑N
i=1 ‖wi‖
2
2
≤ γ2, (22)
where Qi = Q
′
i
> 0, Q¯i = Q¯
′
i
≥ 0 are given matrices,
‖x0‖
2
P
= x′
0
Px0, P = P
′ > 0 is a fixed matrix to be de-
termined later, wi , [ξ
′, ξ′
i
, ν′
i
]′, w , [w′
1
, . . . ,w′
N
]′, and
γ > 0 is a constant.
Properties (i) and (ii) reflect a desirable behaviour of the at-
tack detector. Indeed, it follows from (22) that each attack de-
tector output variable εˆi = Υiǫˆi provides an H∞ estimate of fˆi.
We now show that for admissible attacks, this output converges
to fi, and hence it can be used as a residual output indicating
whether an admissible attack is taking place.
Theorem 1. (i) Suppose fi are admissible biasing inputs and
the distributed networked attack detector (18) is such that
condition (22) holds. Then
∫ ∞
0
‖εˆi − fi‖
2dt < ∞ ∀i.
(ii) Furthermore, if in addition the disturbance and attack-
free large-scale system (21) is asymptotically stable, and
also (22) holds with Q¯i > 0, then limt→∞ zi = 0,
limt→∞ ‖εˆi − fi‖ = 0 for all biasing inputs fi ∈ F .
Proof: To prove statement (i), let σ¯ , maxi ‖Υi‖
2, and σ >
0 be a constant such that Qi > σI ∀i. Then, since for any
admissible attack input fi, νi = fˆi − fi is L2-integrable (see (6)),
we have
N∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
‖εˆi − fi‖
2dt
≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
N∑
i=1
‖̟i‖
2dt + 2
∫ ∞
0
N∑
i=1
‖νi‖
2dt
≤
2σ¯
σ
∫ ∞
0
N∑
i=1
δ′iQiδidt + 2
∫ ∞
0
N∑
i=1
‖νi‖
2dt < ∞. (23)
Next we prove statement (ii). First consider the disturbance
and attack free system comprised of the plant (1) and the net-
work of observers (4), when ξ ≡ 0, ξi ≡ 0 and fi ≡ 0 ∀i. In this
case, we also have fˆi ≡ 0, and νi ≡ 0 since the system in Fig. 1
has zero initial conditions; see (10). Asymptotic stability of the
system (21) implies that in the disturbance and attack free case,
zi → 0, δi → 0 asymptotically. The latter property implies that
‖ǫˆi − fˆi‖ → 0, and since fi = fˆi ≡ 0, then ‖ǫˆi − fi‖ → 0 ∀i.
When a disturbance or an attack input is present, i.e., if ξ . 0
or, for at least one j, ξ j . 0 or f j . 0, then it follows from
(22) that δi, zi, are L2-integrable for all i = 1, . . . ,N. Further-
more, according to (20), δ˙i and z˙i are also L2-integrable; this
fact implies that zi → 0, δi → 0 and ̟i → 0 as t → 0 for all
i = 1, . . . ,N. Then, to establish that limt→∞ ‖εˆi − fi‖ = 0 ∀i, we
consider two cases.
Case 1: For all nodes i which are not under attack, fi ≡
0 and fˆi ≡ 0. In this case, δi → 0 implies εˆi = −̟i → 0
asymptotically, and since fi ≡ 0, we have limt→∞ ‖εˆi − fi‖ = 0.
Case 2: When node i is under attack, then fi . 0. At that
node, we have ‖εˆi − fi‖ ≤ ‖̟i‖ + ‖νi‖. Equation (9) states that
limt→∞ ‖νi‖ = 0, and we have established previously that̟ j →
0 asymptotically for all j = 1, . . . ,N, including j = i. This
implies that εˆi tracks fi. asymptotically. 
Remark 2. Part (i) of Theorem 1 guarantees that each residual
output of the detector converges to the corresponding admissi-
ble attack input fi in an L2 sense. In part (ii), by taking into
account the properties of admissible biasing attack inputs of
class F , (of which the biasing attack inputs considered in [26]
are a special case), a sharper asymptotic tracking behaviour of
the residual variables εˆi is obtained. This however requires a
version of the condition (22) to hold in which Q¯i > 0 ∀i. In the
sequel, conditions will be given which guarantee this. 
We explain in the next section how the coefficients L˜i, K˜i,
Lˇi, and Kˇi can be found to guarantee satisfaction of the condi-
tions stated in Problem 1. This will provide a complete solution
to the problem of detecting biasing attacks on distributed state
observer networks under consideration. Further in Section 5,
it will be shown that the proposed detector can also be used to
negate effects of biasing attacks.
4. A vector dissipativity-based design of the attack detector
In the previous section we have recast the problem of attack
detection under consideration as a problem of distributed stabi-
lization of the large-scale system comprised of subsystems (20)
via output injection. References [9, 27, 29] developed a vec-
tor dissipativity approach to solve this class of problems. This
approach will be applied here to obtain an algorithm for con-
structing a state observer network to detect biasing attacks on
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distributed filters. The idea behind this approach is to deter-
mine the coefficients L˜i, K˜i, Lˇi, and Kˇi for the error dynamics
system (20) to ensure that each subsystem (20) satisfies certain
dissipation inequalities
V˙i + 2αiVi + δ
′
iQˇiδi + z
′
i Q˜izi ≤
∑
j∈V j
π jV j + γ
2‖wi‖
2, (24)
where Vi(zi, δi) is a candidate storage function for the error dy-
namics system (20), Qˇi ≥ 0, Q˜i ≥ 0 are symmetric positive
semidefinite matrices, and αi > 0 and πi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,N, are
constants selected so that qiπi < 2αi.
Unlike standard dissipation inequalities, the vector dissipa-
tion inequalities (24) are coupled. Next, we show how they can
be used to establish input tracking properties of the distributed
attack detector (18). It utilizes a collection of quadratic storage
functions Vi(zi, δi) = [z
′
i
δ′
i
]Xi[z
′
i
δ′
i
]′, with Xi = X
′
i
> 0.
Lemma 1. Suppose a set of matrices Xi = X
′
i
> 0 and con-
stants αi > 0, πi ∈ (0, 2αi/qi) can be found which verify the in-
equalities (24). Then the collection of detectors (18) has prop-
erties stated in Problem 1, with the following matrices P and
Qi, Q¯i in (22):
P = γ−2
N∑
i=1
X11i ,
where X11
i
is the upper left block in the partition of Xi compat-
ible with the dimensions of zi and δi; and
Qi = Qˇi + ρλmin(Xi)I > 0, and
Q¯i = Q˜i + ρλmin(Xi)I > 0, (25)
where ρ = mini(2αi − qiπi) > 0.
The proof of the lemma is similar to the proof of the corre-
sponding vector dissipativity results in [27, 29, 28]. For com-
pleteness, it is included in the Appendix.
Remark 3. One appropriate candidate for πi is πi =
2αi
qi+1
,
where qi is the out-degree of the graph node i. Clearly πi =
2αi
qi+1
<
2αi
qi
, which makes the value of πi a suitable candidate to
be used in condition (24). 
We now present a method to compute the coefficients L˜i, K˜i,
Lˇi, Kˇi to satisfy the dissipation inequalities (24). Let
Ai =
[
A −FiΥi
0 Ωi
]
, B1i =
[
Fi
Γi
]
, B2 =
[
−B 0
0 0
]
,
Di =
[
Di D¯i
]
, Ci =
[
Ci 0
]
, H =
[
H 0
]
,
Li =
[
L˜i
Lˇi
]
, Ki =
[
K˜i
Kˇi
]
, Qi =
[
Q˜i 0
0 Qˇi
]
. (26)
Suppose Di and D¯i satisfy the condition
Ei , DiD
′
i = DiD
′
i + D¯iD¯i
′
> 0; (27)
this is a standard assumption made in H∞ control problems [1].
Lemma 2. Suppose the digraph G, the matrices Qˇi = Qˇ
′
i
≥ 0,
Q˜i = Q˜
′
i
≥ 0 and the constants αi > 0, πi ∈ (0, 2αi/qi), i =
1, . . . ,N, are such that the coupled linear matrix inequalities in
(29) (on the next page) with respect to the variablesXi = X
′
i
> 0
and Mi, i = 1, . . . ,N, are feasible. Then choosing
Ki = −X
−1
i Mi,
Li = (γ
2X−1i C
′
i − B2D
′
i)E
−1
i (28)
ensures that the condition (24) holds.
The proof of this lemma is given in the Appendix. Com-
bined with Theorem 1, this lemma provides a complete result
on the design of biasing attack detectors for the distributed ob-
server (4). This result is now formally stated. The first part of
the following theorem is concerned with detecting general ad-
missible attacks targeting any of the observer nodes, while the
second part particularizes this result to biasing attacks of class
F , including bias injection attacks considered in [26].
Theorem 2. Suppose the coupled linear matrix inequalities in
(29) with respect to the variables Xi = X
′
i
> 0 and Mi,
i = 1, . . . ,N, are feasible. Then, partitioning the matrices
in (28) to obtain L˜i, K˜i, Lˇi, Kˇi, and letting L¯i = L˜i − Li,
K¯i = K˜i − Ki guarantees that for all admissible attack inputs,∫ ∞
0
‖εˆi − fi‖
2dt < ∞ ∀i. Furthermore, limt→∞ ‖εˆi − fi‖ = 0 for
all attack inputs fi of class F . In particular, this conclusion
holds for all biasing attack inputs of the form ‘a constant plus
an exponentially decaying transient’.
Proof: The theorem follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 and The-
orem 1. 
The claim of Theorem 2 involves the collection of LMIs (29)
coupled in the variables Xi and γ. When the attack detector
network is designed offline, these LMIs can be solved in a rou-
tine manner using the existing software. Also, the LMI prob-
lem (29) can be formulated within an optimization framework
where one seeks to determine a suboptimal level of disturbance
attenuation in condition (22). It has been shown in [34] that
a similar optimization problem can be solved in a distributed
manner, where each network node computes its own gain co-
efficients by communicating with its nearest neighbours over a
balanced graph. The algorithm was based on the well known
distributed optimization methods [3, 4]. [34] considered the
problem of suboptimal disturbance attenuation stated in [27].
However [27] and this paper have a common feature in that
the original problem is reduced to the problem of stabilization
of an uncertain large-scale system by output injection, and in
both cases, the LMIs reflect vector dissipativity properties of
the error dynamics. This leads us to suggest that the approach
of [34] can potentially be a candidate to consider should one
need to synthesize a distributed attack detector network of the
form (18) online.
Remark 4. This paper derives the attack detector for the
worst-case scenario where potentially all nodes can be com-
promised at the same time. We do not impose an upper bound
on the number of nodes that can be compromised, and our re-
sult guarantees the detector performance for this worst case
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Si XiB1i XiB2(I − D
′
i
E−1
i
Di) −MiH . . . −MiH
B′
1i
Xi −γ
2I 0 0 . . . 0
(I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di)B
′
2
Xi 0 −γ
2I 0 . . . 0
−H′M′
i
0 0 −π j1X j1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
−H′M′
i
0 0 0 . . . −π jpi X jpi

< 0, (29)
Si = Xi
(
Ai + αiI + B2D
′
iE
−1
i Ci
)
+
(
Ai + αiI + B2D
′
iE
−1
i Ci
)′
Xi + piMiH + piH
′M′i +Qi − γ
2C′iE
−1
i Ci.
scenario. However, it is not unreasonable to query whether the
performance of the proposed attack detector can be improved if
one knows that certain nodes are safe. First, we note that at the
safe node we have fi(t) ≡ 0 and νi(t) ≡ 0. Therefore, reducing
the number of compromised nodes will immediately manifest
itself in the reduced total energy of the ‘attack tracking’ errors∑N
i=1
∫ ∞
0
‖νi‖
2dt which bounds the energy in the detection error;
see (23). Furthermore, if we know that certain node i is safe,
this knowledge can be captured by letting Fi = 0. In the case,
it follows from (15) that ǫi(t) ≡ 0, and the error ei satisfies the
same equation as the error ei of the original unbiased observer
(however, this does not mean that the two errors are identical
since e j in (15) can be biased). Also, we can choose the trans-
fer function Gi(s) = 0 for this node, which means we can let
Γi = 0. As a result, the matrix B1i becomes a zero matrix, and
this simplified modeling will result in the detector error system
at this node subjected to ‘less uncertainty’; see equation (42) in
the Appendix. We expect that this should have an effect on the
convergence rate of the detector and its robustness.
Remark 5. Unlike [14, 16], it is not necessary for the network
graph in this paper to be dense. It is assumed in [14, 16] that
the communication graph must be very dense to allow removing
of suspicious nodes while preserving the connectivity between
the agents. Such a restrictive assumption is not required in this
paper. We take advantage of the dynamic model (10) of bias-
ing attack inputs. As a result, our attack detection algorithm is
based on a model based estimation technique which generally
does not limit the number of affected nodes. This approach con-
trasts with the approach in [14, 16], which makes no assump-
tions about the type of the biasing signal but limits the number
of compromised nodes that can be tolerated.
Remark 6. A question arises as to how the network structure
plays a role in satisfying the LMIs (29). Ultimately, as is com-
mon in the H∞ control theory, the feasibility of the LMIs (29)
is related to detectability properties of the system (20), and we
will explain in Section 6 how the network topology influences
detectability of the detector network.
5. Resilient distributed estimation
Based on the foregoing analysis, we now show that equipping
the network of estimators (4) with the attack detectors (18) al-
lows to obtain state estimates of the plant (1) that are resilient
to admissible biasing attacks. More precisely, consider the net-
work of estimators (4) augmented with the attack detectors (18)
and introduce ‘corrected’ estimates
xˆi = xˆi + eˆi; (30)
here xˆi is the ‘biased’ estimate produced by the observer (4),
and eˆi is the correction term representing an estimate of the er-
ror ei produced by the attack detector (18). Note that the cor-
rection term is added at every network node, so that each node
of the augmented observer-detector system (4), (18) produces
two estimates of the plant state, xˆi and xˆi.
Clearly, x − xˆi = ei − eˆi = zi. That is, zi is the error asso-
ciated with the estimate (30). It follows from Theorem 1, that
for biasing attacks of class F , solving Problem 1 with Q¯ > 0
ensures that this error vanishes asymptotically. That is, unlike
estimates xˆi delivered by (4) which become biased when fi . 0,
the corrected estimates xˆi maintain fidelity under attack. Fur-
thermore, equation (22) provides a bound on performance of
the distributed estimator comprised of the node estimators (4),
the attack detectors (18) and the outputs (30). This discussion
is now summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider the observer network (4) augmented
with the distributed networked attack detector (18) whose coef-
ficients L¯i, K¯i, Lˇi, Kˇi are obtained from the LMIs (29) using the
procedure described in Theorem 2. Then the following state-
ments hold
(a) In the absence of disturbances and attack, xˆi → x exponen-
tially for all i = 1, . . . ,N;
(b) In the presence of perturbations and biasing attacks of
class F , limt→∞ ‖x − xˆi‖ = 0 ∀i. Furthermore, the esti-
mation error zi = x − xˆi satisfies (22) with Qi > 0, Q¯i > 0
defined in (25). That is, xˆi provides a resilient estimate of
the plant when the observer network is subject to a biasing
attack. In particular, this conclusion holds for all biasing
attack inputs of the form ‘a constant plus an exponentially
decaying transient’.
Proof: The conditions of the theorem guarantee that (24)
holds for every i; see Lemma 2. Furthermore, as was shown in
Lemma 2, this implies that statements (i) and (ii) of Problem 1
hold, with Qi > 0, Q¯i > 0 defined in (25). Finally, we have
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observed in the proof of Theorem 1 that since according to (22),
δi, zi are L2-integrable for all i, we have z˙i ∈ L2, for all L2-
integrable ξ, ξi and admissible fi. This implies that zi → 0. 
Theorem 3 shows that the proposed attack detection network
is capable of mitigating biasing attacks on distributed state esti-
mation networks. Condition (22) characterizes its performance
under attack. Of course, when the system is attack free, perfor-
mance of the augmented observer-detector filter (4), (18) may
be inferior to performance of the original unbiased distributed
filter (3), and we do not propose xˆi as a replacement for xˆi in
the attack free situation. On the other hand, when some of the
network nodes are misappropriated and are subject to biasing
attacks, the signals xˆi produced by the augmented observer-
detector system (4), (18) are unbiased. This shows that aug-
menting the observer network (4) with the network of attack
monitors (18) provides a guarantee of resilience, ensuring that
the distributed observer remains functional during hostile oper-
ating conditions. Of course, we do not suggest using inferior
estimates xˆi in an attack free situation. When the network is not
under attack, we have fi = 0 and the state observer (4) produces
unbiased estimates xˆi of the plant state x which are identical to
the estimates produced by the original observer (3). In this case,
we do not observe a performance degradation. The attack de-
tector will produce zero residuals in this case. However when
the network is subjected to a biasing attack, the residuals will
deviate from zero. This will signal the presence of an attack.
A threshold-based policy can then be devised to switch the ob-
server outputs from the original estimates xˆi to the resilient es-
timates xˆi. The design of such threshold-based policy is well
studied in the fault detection literature, and we refer the reader
to that literature; see e.g. [12].
6. Detectability of biasing attacks and relation to the net-
work topology
The role of the network topology in facilitating distributed
estimation is an interesting question which is under active in-
vestigation. For networks of observers of the form (3), condi-
tions for detectability were obtained in [32, 31]. In particular,
this necessarily requires the pair (A¯, [C¯′, H¯′]′) to be detectable;
here A¯ = IN ⊗ A, C¯ = diag[C1, · · · ,CN], H¯ = L ⊗ H, and
L is the N × N Laplacian matrix of the graph. It was shown
in [32, 31] that several factors affect the detectability of the
network: (a) the decomposition of the network into compo-
nents spanned by trees, (b) the detectability properties of the
pairs (A,Ci), (c) the observability properties of the pair (A,H).
From the results in [32, 31], for (A¯, [C¯′, H¯′]′) to be detectable,
each node must be able to reconstruct from its interconnec-
tions with the neighbours the portion of the state information
which cannot be obtained from its local measurements. This
makes estimation task feasible even when the Laplacian ma-
trix L has more than one zero eigenvalue. A general condition
on the graph structure is that there should be a path in the net-
work from the sensors that can measure a certain portion of the
states to those that cannot measure this portion. So in general,
if there are several sensors that can measure the same portion
of the state, it is not necessary for them to be connected, and
they provide this information to other nodes in the subgraphs
they belong to. More recently, similar conclusions have been
made in [18, 15, 33], where somewhat more general data fusion
schemes were considered using observers whose dimension is
greater than the dimension of the plant’s state vector x.
In this section we build on the results in [32, 31] and provide
some insight into some fundamental attack input detectability
properties of the proposed distributed attack detector.
Define e¯i = [z
′
i
δ′
i
]′ and let e¯ be the vector of all detector errors
stacked together, e¯ = [z, δ], z = [z′
1
, . . . z′
N
]′, δ = [δ′
1
, . . . , δN]
′.
Then the disturbance and attack-free detection error dynamics
in (21) can be written in a compact form,
˙¯e =
[
A¯ −F¯
0 Ω¯
]
e¯ +
[
−L˜ −K˜
−Lˇ −Kˇ
] [
C¯ 0
H¯ 0
]
e¯, (31)
where L˜ = diag{L˜i}, K˜ = diag{K˜i}, F¯ = diag{FiΥi}, Lˇ =
diag{Lˇi}, Kˇ = diag{Kˇi} and Ω¯ = diag{Ωi}. Also, define
A =
[
A¯ −F¯
0 Ω¯
]
, C =
[
C¯ 0
H¯ 0
]
. (32)
We conclude that for the system (20) to be stabilizable via out-
put injection, the pair (A ,C ) must necessarily be detectable.
We now relate this condition to the detectability of the pair
(A¯, [C¯′, H¯′]′) of the original observer network (4).
Let s∗ and ∆¯(s∗) be an unstable eigenvalue and the corre-
sponding eigenspace of Ω¯. Define the following sets,
D(s∗) =
{
y : y = F¯δ, δ ∈ ∆¯(s∗)
}
,
Y (s∗) =
{
y : y = (A¯ − s∗I)z, z ∈ KerC¯ ∩ KerH¯
}
.
Theorem 4. The pair (A ,C ) is detectable if and only if the
following conditions hold:
(i) the pair
(
A¯,
[
C¯
H¯
])
is detectable;
(ii) the pair (Ω¯, F¯) is detectable; and
(iii) For every unstable eigenvalue s∗ of Ω¯,
Y (s∗) ∩D(s∗) = {0}. (33)
Proof: The pair (A ,C ) is detectable if and only if [11]
rank
[
A − sI
C
]
= n, ∀s ∈ C : Re(s) ≥ 0. (34)
In other words, (A ,C ) is detectable if and only if ∀s ∈ C :
Re(s) ≥ 0, the following equations hold only for [z′ δ′]′ = 0:
(A − sI)
[
z
δ
]
= 0, C
[
z
δ
]
= 0. (35)
Expanding (35) we obtain
(A¯ − sI)z − F¯δ = 0, (36a)
(Ω − sI)δ = 0, (36b)
C¯z = 0, (36c)
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H¯z = 0. (36d)
Sufficiency. We now verify that under the conditions (i)–(iii)
of the theorem, (36) hold only if z = 0, δ = 0.
First consider the case where s, Re(s) ≥ 0, is not an eigen-
value of Ω¯. In this case, (36b) implies δ = 0 and the remaining
conditions (36) read that
(A¯ − sI)z = 0, (37a)
C¯z = 0, (37b)
H¯z = 0. (37c)
It then follows from (i) and (37) that z = 0. Hence, if s, Re(s) ≥
0, is not an eigenvalue of Ω¯ then (36) implies z = 0, δ = 0.
Next, suppose s = s∗, where s∗ is an unstable eigenvalue of
Ω¯. In this case, (36b) allows for both a zero and a nonzero solu-
tion δ∗. The case where δ∗ = 0 has been considered previously,
it has led to the conclusion that z = 0, δ = 0 is the only solu-
tion to the system (36). In the case where δ∗ , 0, we conclude
that δ∗ is an eigenvector corresponding to s∗ and δ∗ ∈ ∆¯(s∗).
Furthermore, since (Ω¯, F¯) is detectable according to (ii), then
F¯δ∗ , 0. It then follows from (33) that for any z which satisfies
(36c) and (36d), (A¯ − s∗I)z − Fδ∗ , 0. Hence, (36) cannot have
a nonzero solution in this case as well.
In summary, we conclude that the pair (A ,C ) is detectable.
Necessity. In this part of the proof (A ,C ) is assumed to be
detectable. We now show that a violation of any of the condi-
tions in (i)–(iii) results in (36) having a nonzero solution (z, δ).
Suppose that
(
A¯,
[
C¯
H¯
])
is not detectable. Then there exists
z∗ , 0 which satisfies (37). Substituting z = z∗ into (36) results
in the equations
F¯δ = 0, (Ω¯ − sI)δ = 0, (38)
which are satisfied with δ = 0. Thus, when
(
A¯,
[
C¯
H¯
])
is not
detectable, then (36) admits a nonzero solution (z∗, 0). This
contradicts the assumption that (A ,C ) is detectable.
Next, suppose (Ω¯, F¯) is not detectable. Let s∗ be an unstable
unobservable mode of (Ω¯, F¯), and let δ∗ be a nonzero solution
of (38) with s = s∗. Substituting δ = δ∗ and z = 0 into (36)
shows that (0, δ∗) is a solution to (36) when s = s∗. We have
arrived at a contradiction with the assumption that (A ,C ) is
detectable.
Finally, suppose that Ω¯ has an unstable eigenvalue s∗ for
which the set Y (s∗) ∩ D(s∗) contains y∗ , 0. This implies
the existence of a nonzero z∗ ∈ KerC¯ ∩ KerH¯ and a nonzero
δ∗ ∈ ∆(s∗) such that (A¯ − s∗I)z∗ = F¯δ∗ = y∗. Hence, we con-
clude that (z∗, δ∗) , 0 satisfies (36). Again, this conclusion is in
contradiction with the assumption that (A ,C ) is detectable. 
Condition (i) can be related to detectability properties of each
node and properties of the network topology. As mentioned, de-
tectability of the pair
(
A¯,
[
C¯
H¯
])
is related to the properties of the
network graph, detectability properties of the pairs (A,Ci) and
observability properties of (A,H). We refer the reader to [32]
for the analysis of this relationship. As far as our analysis in
this paper is concerned, we consider attacks on a given net-
work of observers (3), therefore it is reasonable to assume that
the pair
(
A¯,
[
C¯
H¯
])
is detectable, otherwise such a network will
not be functional. The detectability of the pair (Ω¯, F¯) (condi-
tion (ii)) is immediately related to the detectability of every pair
(Ωi, FiΥi) i = 1, . . . ,N. If the attack tracking model does not
guarantee this, this creates a possibility for the attack detector to
have an undetectable subspace. Estimation errors within those
subspaces cannot be monitored accurately, and the attacker can
exploit this fact to create biased estimates. Condition (iii) is
more subtle; it is directly related to the network structure since
it involves a set which is a linear transformation of a subset of
KerL ⊗ H; the latter set depends on the graph Laplacian L .
The failure to satisfy this condition will also lead to biased de-
tector errors.
7. Simulations
To illustrate the performance of the fault detection algorithm
proposed in this paper, we revisit the example in [27] where
A =

0.3775 0 0 0 0 0
0.2959 0.3510 0 0 0 0
1.4751 0.6232 1.0078 0 0 0
0.2340 0 0 0.5596 0 0
0 0 0 0.4437 1.1878 −0.0215
0 0 0 0 2.2023 1.0039

,
B = 0.1I6×6, H = I6×6,
Di = 02×6, D¯i = 0.01I2, ∀i = 1, . . . , 6,
(39)
and each sensor imeasures the i-th and (i+ 1)-th coordinates of
the state vector, with sensor 6 measuring the 6th and 1st coor-
dinates. Therefore, for example for the 4th sensor, we have
C4 =
[
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
]
. (40)
The reason why this example is chosen is that all the pairs
(A,Ci), i = 1, · · · , 6 in this example are not observable, and
A is anti-stable which ensures that at every node of the net-
work, the unobservable modes of A are not detectable. In
[27], a distributed observer was constructed for this system
which consisted of N = 6 observer nodes interconnected over
a simple circular digraph, with V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and E =
{(6, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), (5, 6)}.
We assume that scalar biasing attacks can be applied at any
node of the observer network, and assume Fi = [1 1 1 1 1 1]
′
∀i = 1, . . . , 6. We limit attention to the special case of bias
inputs admissible withGi(s) =
1
s+2βi
I6, βi > 0 and design an L2-
tracking detector based on Theorem 2. We let βi, i = 1, · · · , 6
in (11) be βi = 10. Letting all αi = 2 and γ
2
= 0.5, it was
found using the YALMIP software [13] that the LMI problem
in (29) was feasible. The LMI variables Ki and Li in (28) were
calculated using YALMIP, and then using (26), the values for
L˜i, K˜i, Lˇi and Kˇi were obtained. Using the gain values Li and Ki
of the observer in (3) obtained in the example in [27], we then
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calculated the observer gain values in (18), L¯i = L˜i − Li and
K¯i = K˜i − Ki.
To illustrate performance of the obtained attack detectors
(18) and the corresponding resilient estimators (4), (30), the
system was simulated using Matlab. The initial conditions of
the plant (1) were chosen randomly, and the process and mea-
surement disturbances were selected to be broadband white
noises of intensity 1. An attack signal f2 was applied at node 2
at time t = 2s which lasted for 5s. During this time, the value
of f2(t) in (4) changes from zero at t = 2s to the value of 5 and
becomes zero again at t = 7s.
Figures 2–5 show the errors exhibited by the obtained attack
detectors (18) and the corresponding biased and resilient ob-
servers (4) and (30), respectively, in response to this attack.
It can be seen in Fig. 2, all nodes in the system are affected
by the attack, and the estimation errors at every node become
biased during the time interval 2 ≤ t ≤ 7. As expected, the
biasing effect of the attack is most prominent at node 2, and
node 1 is least affected, as ‖x(t) − xˆ1(t)‖ < ‖x(t) − xˆi(t)‖ <
‖x(t) − xˆ2(t)‖ for i = 3, · · · , 6 and for almost all t ∈ [2, 7].
However, Fig 3 shows that the attack detectors (18) are able to
reliably identify the source of attack and track the attack input
quite accurately. This figure shows that εˆ2(t) changes at t = 2s
and t = 7s indicating an attack at node 2, while other residual
variables εˆi(t), i , 2 appear to be unaffected by the attack. Also,
the estimates xˆi computed according to (30) show much greater
resilience to the attack, compared with xˆi. Although xˆi tend
to be somewhat less accurate than xˆi under normal conditions,
their error appear to be not affected by the attack; see Fig. 4. To
further illustrate this point, Figures 5 and 6 compare the errors
of the two observers at the most affected node 2 and the least
affected node 1. As one can see, in both cases the estimates xˆi
appear to be unaffected by the attack.
Figure 2: Norms of the errors of the observers (4).
8. Conclusion
The paper is concerned with the problem of distributed at-
tack detection in sensor networks. We consider a group of
Figure 3: Norms of the residual outputs εˆi(t) of the attack detectors (18). All
residuals except that at the misappropriated node 2, have low amplitude and
only respond to disturbances in the system. On the other hand, the residual
εˆ2(t) is able to detect and track the biasing input f2(t).
Figure 4: Norms of the errors of the resilient estimates (30), produced using the
biased observers (4) augmented with the attack detectors (18).
consensus-based distributed estimators and assume that the es-
timator dynamics are under attack. Then we propose a dis-
tributed attack detector which allows for an uncertainty in the
sensors and the plant model, as well as a range of bias attack
inputs, and show that the proposed attack detector can detect
an biasing attack and identify the misappropriated node. Also,
we show that these detectors can be used to compensate the bi-
asing effect of the attack, once it is detected. Although under
normal circumstances, the proposed resilient estimates are less
accurate than the estimates produced by the original network,
they show superior resilience to the attack, in that they asymp-
totically converge to the state of the plant under a broad range
of L2 integrable perturbations and biasing attack inputs. The
limitation of the proposed scheme lies in the assumption that
in principle, admissible attack inputs can be tracked using a
low-pass filter and that the tracking error is L2 integrable. This
restricts the class of attack inputs that can be detected and coun-
tered using our approach. Future effort will be directed towards
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Figure 5: Norms of the errors of the biased and resilient estimates at the misap-
propriated node 2. The error of the resilient observer incorporating the attack
detector is substantially lower than the error of the corresponding observer of
the biased network. The estimate (30) at this node appears to be not affected
by the attack, it maintains roughly the same level of accuracy during the attack
as before and after the attack. However, the error is somewhat greater than the
error of the original observer from [27] when it operates normally.
relaxing this assumption.
Another future problem is to consider link failures under de-
nial of service attacks which aim to disrupt the normal flow
of information within the network. Sparse networks are more
likely to fail under a jamming attack, and for the observer to
maintain resilience, additional connectivity within the network
may be required. This contrasts with the problem considered
in this paper where the attacker relies on dense connectivity to
spread the biased xˆi across the network. In this situation, sparse
topologies appear to be beneficial for the defender. An inter-
esting problem would be to determine which strategy is more
beneficial for the attacker facing a particular network (biasing,
jamming or a combination of both), and which network struc-
ture provides for the best resilient performance under this strat-
egy. We leave this challenging problem for future research.
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Appendix
8.1. Proof of equation (9)
Observe that an input fi of class F has a Laplace transform
of the form fi(s) =
R0
s
+
∑
k
Rk
(s+pk)
lk
with Re(pk) < 0, lk ≥ 1,
∀k. By assumption, (I + 1
s
Gi(s))
−1 has all its poles in the region
Re(s) < 0, therefore ∀ fi ∈ F ,
νi(s) = −(I +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1 fi(s) =
Rˆ0
s
+
∑
k
Rˆk
(s + pˆk)lˆk
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Figure 6: Norms of the errors of the biased and resilient estimates at node 1,
which is most distant from the misappropriated node. Even at the most distant
node, the error of the resilient observer incorporating the attack detector is al-
most half of the error of the corresponding observer of the biased network. The
error appears to be unaffected by the attack, although it is somewhat greater
than the error of the original observer from [27] when it operates normally.
with Re( pˆk) < 0, lˆk ≥ 1, ∀k. This time the summation is car-
ried out over the joint set of poles which includes stable poles
of both (I + 1
s
Gi(s))
−1 and fi(s). Hence limt→∞ νi(t) exists. Fur-
thermore,
‖sνi(s)‖ ≤ ‖(I +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1‖ · ‖s fi(s)‖
and lims→0 ‖s fi(s)‖ = limt→∞ ‖ fi(t)‖ < ∞. Then according to
the final value theorem,
lim
t→∞
‖ fi(t) − fˆi(t)‖ ≤ lim
s→0
(
‖(I +
1
s
Gi(s))
−1‖ · ‖s fi(s)‖
)
= 0.
8.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Let V =
∑N
i=1 Vi. Adding the inequalities (24) and selecting
πi <
2αi
qi
will result in
V˙ +
N∑
i=1
(δ′iQiδi + z
′
i Q˜izi)
≤ −ρV + γ2
N∑
i=1
(‖ξ‖2 + ‖ξi‖
2
+ ‖νi‖
2); (41)
here ρ = mini(2αi − qiπi) > 0. This implies that when ξ = 0
and fi = 0, ξi = 0 ∀i, then V˙ < −ρV, and since Xi > 0, we
have zi → 0, δi → 0 exponentially. That is, condition (i) of
Problem 1 is established.
Also, when at least one of the signals ξ, ξi or fi is not equal
to zero (the latter is equivalent to νi . 0), then it follows from
(41) that with Qi, Q¯i defined in (25),
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(δ′iQiδi + z
′
i Q¯izi)dt ≤
N∑
i=1
[Vi(zi(0), δi(0))
+ γ2
∫ T
0
(‖ξ‖2 + ‖ξi‖
2
+ ‖νi‖
2)dt
]
.
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Note that Vi(zi(0), δi(0)) = x
′
0
X11
i
x0. Hence (22) also holds with
P = γ−2
∑N
i=1 X
11
i
and Qi, Q¯i defined in (25).
8.3. Proof of Lemma 2
With the notation (26) and letting µi = [z
′
i
δ′
i
]′, the system
(20) can be represented in the form
µ˙i = (Ai − LiCi)µi +
∑
j∈Vi
KiH(µ j − µi)
+ B1iνi − (B2 + LiDi)wi(t), (42)
µi(0) =
[
zi(0)
δi(0)
]
, wi ,
[
ξ
ξi
]
.
To establish the vector dissipativity properties of the system
(42) we proceed as in [28, 29].
By pre-multiplying and post-multiplying the matrix inequal-
ity (29) by [µ′
i
φ′
1
φ′
2
µ′
j1
· · ·µ′
jpi
] and its transpose we obtain
0 > 2µ′iXi(Ai + αiI − LiCi)µi + 2µ
′
iXiKiH
∑
j∈Vi
µ j
+2γ2µ′iC
′
iE
−1
i Ciµi − 2piµ
′
iXiKiHµi
+µ′iQiµi − γ
2µ′iC
′
iE
−1
i Ciµi − γ
2‖φ1 −
1
γ2
B′1iXiµi‖
2
+
1
γ2
µ′iXiB1iB
′
1iXiµi − γ
2‖φ2 −
1
γ2
(
I − D′iE
−1
i Di
)
B′2Xiµi‖
2
+
1
γ2
µ′iXiB2
(
I − D′iE
−1
i Di
)
B′2Xiµi −
∑
j∈Vi
π jµ
′
jX jµ j.
Note that
(
I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di
)
is a projection matrix and thus(
I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di
) (
I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di
)
=
(
I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di
)
. Fur-
thermore, it can be shown by direct calculations that
1
γ2
B2
(
I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di
)
B′
2
=
1
γ2
(B2 + LiDi)(B2 + LiDi)
′ −
γ2X−1
i
C′
i
E−1
i
CiX
−1
i
. Hence for any vector [µi µ j1 · · ·µ jp ] , 0,
letting φ2 =
1
γ2
(
I − D′
i
E−1
i
Di
)
B′
2
Xiµi and φ1 =
1
γ2
B′
1i
Xiµi leads
to the inequality
0 > 2µ′iXi(Ai + αiI − LiCi)µi + µ
′
iQiµi −
∑
j∈Vi
π jµ
′
jX jµ j
+γ2‖νi −
1
γ2
(B1i)
′Xiµi‖
2
+ 2µ′iXiB1iνi − γ
2‖νi‖
2
+γ2‖wi +
1
γ2
(B2 + LiDi)
′Xiµi‖
2 − γ2‖wi‖
2
−2µ′iXi(B2 + LiDi)wi + 2µ
′
iXiKiH
∑
j∈Vi
(µ j − µi).
Then it follows from the above inequality that
V˙i ≤ −2αiµ
′
iXiµi − µ
′
iQiµi + γ
2‖νi‖
2
+ γ2‖wi‖
2
+
∑
j∈Vi
π jµ
′
jX jµ j.
Thus for all i = 1, · · · ,N the inequality (24) holds.
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